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 4,3–11,4) and 76 adults serving
as a comparison group participated in two studies that examined how children reason about psychogenic
bodily reactions, that is, ailments or nonconscious physiological responses with origins in the mind (e.g.,
stress-induced headache). Psychogenic bodily reactions provide an opportunity to study how children inte-
grate knowledge between the domains of bodily response and psychology. In Study 1, participants were asked
whether various familiar psychogenic bodily reactions were possible (e.g., can someone get a tummyache from
worrying?). In Study 2, participants were presented with a novel domain (hypothetical “aliens” from outer
space) and were asked whether various unfamiliar bodily conditions (e.g., toes swelling) could arise from various
physical or psychological causes. As predicted, adults typically reported that psychogenic bodily reactions were
possible, and that unfamiliar bodily conditions could result from either psychological or physical causes. In
contrast, young children typically denied that psychogenic bodily reactions could occur and predicted that un-
familiar bodily conditions resulted from physical causes only. The results support a developmental path:
younger children view psychogenic bodily responses as wholly physical, but with age, view them as both




Researchers have shown strong interest in children’s
developing “theories” about the world (Carey, 1985;
Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 1992).
A primary assumption of this work is that theories
are domain specific: Children construct separate the-
ories for physics, psychology, and perhaps biology,
each with their own ontological commitments, causal
processes, and organization (Carey, 1985; Gopnik &
Wellman, 1994). To the extent that children do possess
domain-specific theories, they should honor firm dis-
tinctions between domains. And indeed, a wealth of
evidence suggests that young children honor an onto-
logical distinction between mental/psychological phe-
nomena and bodily/physical phenomena (Coley,
1995; Estes, Wellman, & Woolley, 1989; Harris, Brown,
Marriot, Whithall, & Harmer, 1991; Hatano & Inagaki,
1994; Wellman & Estes, 1986). Few investigators,
however, have studied how children understand con-
cepts that simultaneously involve two domains.
The focus of this article is on how children reason
about phenomena that cross ontological domains.
The study of domain interaction is necessary to gain a
complete picture of children’s basic cognitive pro-
cesses. Although cross-domain reasoning is perhaps
not as common as within-domain reasoning, it does
occur. Psychogenic bodily reactions (bodily ailments
with origins in the mind) may be one of the most fre-
quent, and include such discomforts as tension head-
aches or stress-induced rashes. In fact, pediatricians
report that 17% to 50% of their patients experience
psychogenic reactions (Garralda & Bailey, 1987, 1990;
Kaplan, 1980; Reister, Tress, Schepank, & Manz, 1989).
Other examples of cross-domain phenomena include
biofeedback (in which mental states have physical,
bodily effects) and mind-altering drugs (in which
bodily states have psychological effects).
The present studies examined children’s under-
standing of psychogenic bodily reactions. A psycho-
genic reaction has a psychological cause but a physi-
cal outcome. Thus, to understand what is happening
to the body when one experiences a psychogenic
bodily reaction, one must simultaneously invoke two
domains of knowledge. Therefore, an explanation of
this phenomenon crosses ontological boundaries and
forces the two knowledge domains of body and mind
to interact. With regard to young children’s reason-
ing, at least two developmental paths are possible.
One possibility is that children will readily accept
psychogenic phenomena, either because they fail to
honor an ontological distinction between body and
mind, or because they honor this distinction but ac-
cept that these domains may interact. On this predic-
tion, children should understand psychogenic bodily
reactions as readily as any other bodily reactions. This
result is plausible, given that even preschool children
understand nonobvious causal bases to illness (Kalish,
1996; Siegal, 1988) and contamination (Au, Sidle, &
Rollins, 1993), and probably experience some simple
psychosomatic links themselves (e.g., face getting hot
when angry). Another possibility is that young chil-
dren may have particular difficulty understanding
psychogenic phenomena, either because these phe-
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nomena cross an ontological boundary (i.e., children








bodily, but not both), or because the understanding of
complex psychogenic reactions is dependent on other
factors (e.g., experience). Surprisingly little is known
about children’s understanding of psychogenic bodily
reactions, yet the developmental story should shed
light on the role of ontology in early concepts.
Distinguishing Mental from Bodily Processes
Wellman and Gelman (1992) argued that children
possess common-sense, framework theories (as op-
posed to scientific, specific theories) that loosely orga-
nize their developing understandings. Thus, concepts
of physics differ in character, structure, and develop-
ment from concepts of mental entities and concepts of
biology. Most important for this discussion is that
causal processes are viewed as distinctly different for
physical, mental, and biological entities. Contagion,
for example, is a specifically biological process for un-
derstanding the transmission of illness. Causal pro-
cesses that are not biological, such as psychological
will or intention, cannot spread disease. Thus, laughter
is not contagious in the same way as the flu (Keil, 1992).
Several studies suggest that much of children’s
knowledge is appropriately domain specific. For ex-
ample, children appreciate that psychological phe-
nomena are distinct from physical phenomena—
thoughts and desires are distinct from their physical
counterparts (e.g., a thought about a dog versus an
actual dog; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Estes, 1986).
Likewise, preschoolers understand that bodily pro-
cesses such as breathing or digestion cannot be
changed as a result of psychological factors such as
desires (Inagaki & Hatano, 1993; but see Callanan &
Oakes, 1992). Springer and Ruckel (1992) similarly
found that preschoolers judged that illness can result
from physical but not social factors (e.g., a boy can get
sick from eating food that is very old, but not from
eating food that was stolen). Schult and Wellman
(1997) also found that children appropriately ap-
pealed to different causal processes for events from
different domains, even when the physical action was
identical across domains. For example, even 4-year-
olds realized that physical forces and biological fac-
tors can counteract intentions or desires and supplied
appropriately domain-specific explanations of why
the desired event did not occur.
In summary, preschoolers can distinguish between
mental states and involuntary biological processes
(e.g., preschoolers know that heartbeats are not under
conscious control; Inagaki & Hatano, 1993; Schult &
Wellman, 1997). Past studies, however, have focused
on phenomena for which the psychological/bodily
distinction is appropriate. In contrast, psychogenic
bodily response is of interest for its dual ontology: It








 physical. Thus, how
children construe psychogenic bodily response pro-
vides an opportunity to determine if and when they
invoke the domain distinction, when to do so would
be inappropriate.
Illness Understanding
A selective review of the literature on children’s ill-
ness understanding was provided to clarify the role
of psychogenic bodily reactions in children’s illness
concepts. Traditionally, it had been thought that chil-
dren had little understanding of disease and that their
understanding was limited by Piagetian stages (e.g.,
Bibace & Walsh, 1980). Less cognitively advanced
children were thought to engage in magical thinking
about illness, whereas more cognitively advanced
children were thought to have a more physiological
understanding (Perrin & Gerrity, 1981). Likewise,
children were thought to consider illness in terms of
immanent justice (e.g., punishment for bad deeds;
Kister & Patterson, 1980).
In contrast to this Piagetian-based literature, vari-
ous studies have demonstrated that even young chil-
dren understand several important aspects about ill-
ness. Preschoolers understand that illness is a bodily
state rather than a psychological state (Springer, 1994)
and that illness can have a nonobvious cause (Kalish,
1996; Siegal, 1988). By age 5 children also understand
that illness can manifest in nonobvious symptoms
(Charman & Chandiramani, 1995). Although children
do at times engage in immanent justice reasoning, re-
searchers suggest it is a default response that children
use when they are not yet knowledgeable about the
specific causes of certain events (Kister & Patterson,
1980; Siegal, 1988).
At the same time that children have a generally
accurate framework understanding, they lack a de-
tailed understanding of the causes, physiological
mechanisms, and manifestations of particular ill-
nesses (e.g., Au & Romo, 1999). This can lead to con-
fusion about distinctions among various illnesses
(Sigelman, Estrada, Derenowski, & Woods, 1996;
Sigelman, Maddock, Epstein, & Carpenter, 1993).
Sigelman et al. (1993), in a survey of fourth through
eighth graders and college students, found that the
youngest children were least able to differentiate be-
tween the causes of three diseases (colds, AIDS, and
cancer), and depended on their knowledge of colds
and other infectious diseases to inform their under-




The children had many misconceptions on how each
disease was transmitted, particularly at the youngest
age (see also Charman & Chandiramani, 1995).
Children’s pain concepts are of particular interest
in this context, in that pain is both subjective and
bodily. Thus, children’s understanding of pain pro-
vides at least some insight into their reasoning about
mind–body links. Some evidence suggests that youn-
ger children are less likely than older children to link
the sensation of pain with physical bodily states, such
as increased pressure in blood vessels (Harbeck &
Peterson, 1992). This finding would seem to suggest
that children have some difficulty linking external
bodily conditions with internal, subjective states.
When given a less demanding task, however, even 5-
to 6-year-old children accept biological and physical/
behavioral explanations for pain, although at a lower
rate than older children (Webb, as cited in Taplin,
Goodenough, Webb, & Vogl, 1999). Children of this
age also appreciate that external, physical remedies,
such as applying a cream or a band-aid, can be effec-
tive means of treating pain (Webb, as cited in Taplin et
al., 1999). Thus, by 5 or 6 years of age, children realize
that pain is the result of physical actions and events.
To the extent that pain is understood as a psychologi-
cal state, this would seem to be evidence that young
children acknowledge that bodily events can affect
the mind. The evidence cited does not, however, ad-
dress the issue of whether pain is construed as men-
tal/psychological in the same sense as beliefs, desires,
or emotions.
Present Studies
The present studies examined children’s under-
standing of the interaction of different domains by
using psychogenic bodily reactions as a focus of in-
vestigation. Psychogenic bodily reactions have sev-
eral advantages. First, and in contrast to most past
work, they are phenomena for which psychological
and physical factors truly do interact. Second, psy-
chogenic bodily reactions have a clear empirical basis
and are relatively common. Thus, children are likely
to have had some experience with them—of their
own or of others around them. Third, the components
of psychogenic bodily reactions are fairly simple (e.g.,
feeling worried, getting a stomachache) and likely to
be well understood individually even by young chil-
dren. This contrasts with certain other cross-domain
phenomena, such as biofeedback, which would re-
quire an understanding of complex components (e.g.,
the cardiovascular system).
Two caveats are important to keep in mind. First,
the studies presented in this article examined interac-





tween mind and biology. Thus, the data do not speak
directly to the current debate regarding whether or
not young children have constructed an autonomous
domain of biology (e.g., Carey, 1995; Springer, 1996).
Nonetheless, the issue of domain interaction is an im-
portant problem in its own right. Second, the class of
psychogenic phenomena considered in this study is
only one of a variety of mind–body links that are pos-
sible. Specifically, only cases in which mental states
are causes and bodily states are effects were consid-
ered, not vice versa (e.g., mind-altering drugs). Fur-
thermore, the focus was on bodily outcomes that are
nonconscious, involuntary, and physiological. This
contrasts with mind–body links in which the bodily
outcomes are conscious, voluntary behaviors; for ex-
ample, intending to raise your hand (mental cause)
leads you to raise your hand (behavioral effect). The
present investigation focused on involuntary physio-
logical responses as a starting point because they per-
mitted an especially clear view of domain interac-
tions. That is, involuntary responses themselves have
no known psychological component (in contrast to
voluntary behaviors, which include an element of
psychological intent throughout), and so the extent to
which children believed they could be modified by
psychological states could be examined.
Several investigators have studied children’s ill-
ness understanding, but little is known about chil-
dren’s knowledge of psychogenic bodily reactions.
The limited evidence that is available suggests that
younger children may be less likely than older chil-
dren or adults to view illness as influenced by psy-
chological and affective events (Bibace & Walsh, 1980;
Burbach & Peterson, 1986). Only one study (Harris,
1989) focused directly on psychogenic bodily reac-
tions. In this larger study of children’s illness con-
cepts, qualitative interviews that included questions
about psychogenic bodily reactions were conducted
with healthy and chronically ill British children, aged
6 and 10 years. In one section of the open-ended inter-
view, children were asked whether trying to feel a
particular emotion could make an illness go away
more quickly (or make it get worse). “About one
third” of healthy 6-year-olds versus two thirds of
healthy 10-year-olds said that psychogenic causality
was possible. Meanwhile, “only a handful” of ill 6-
year-olds and less than one third of ill 10-year-olds
said that psychogenic reactions were possible. Harris
inferred from these results that experience as well as
cognitive maturity were important to children’s un-
derstanding of the mind–body connection. Why
chronically ill children endorsed the possibility of
psychogenic effects at a lower rate than healthy chil-
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dren was not clear, but the fact that the ill children
were interviewed in a hospital setting while undergoing
tests may have adversely affected their performance.
The Harris study was a valuable initial investigation
into psychogenic understanding. The interview, how-
ever, included few questions focusing on psychogenic
phenomena (because this was not the focus of the
study), and did not include control questions that
would enable one to determine how children’s re-
sponses to psychogenic questions compared with
possible responses about other consequences of emo-
tions or other cures for illnesses.
The present studies compared children’s under-
standing of cross-domain, psychogenic events with
their understanding of within-domain, psychological
or bodily events that included the same components
that made up the psychogenic events. Various types
of control items were also included to rule out the
possibility that children’s difficulty with psychogenic
items could be attributed to information-processing
demands of the task, logical demands of the task, the
abstract and hypothetical nature of the questions, or
the inclusion of psychological items.
Study 1 investigated the extent to which various
age groups of children believed psychogenic bodily
reactions were possible. It was predicted that children
would not readily acknowledge the possibility of var-
ious types of psychogenic bodily reactions, although
they would acknowledge other behavioral events in-
volving the same psychological causes, as well as
other events involving the same bodily manifesta-
tions involving a physical cause.
Because such results could be attributed to lack of
experience with psychogenic bodily reactions on the
part of the children, Study 2 expanded on Study 1 by
testing children’s understanding of psychogenic phe-
nomena in a novel situation. Instead of asking chil-
dren if other children would experience psychogenic
bodily reactions (situations in which participants
could use their own experience to guide their re-
sponses), Study 2 asked children if creatures from an-
other planet could develop a physical response from
a psychological cause. Because the bodily reactions in
Study 2 were all unknown, participants had minimal
experience upon which to base their answers and
were able to draw only on their naive understanding
of physical and psychological causal processes to
help them answer these items. In this more conserva-
tive test of children’s understanding of psychogenic
bodily reactions, the youngest participants were ex-
pected to reject psychological causes for novel bodily
reactions. Together, this pair of studies provided the





In this study, children were administered a structured
interview in which they were asked whether various
physical, psychological, and moral events could
cause other physical health and behavioral outcomes.
Of primary interest were questions that asked if psy-
chological states could lead a person to have bodily
physical reactions (psychogenic bodily reactions).








4,3–11,4) were included to illuminate the develop-
mental patterns. Another interest was whether chil-
dren’s past personal experience with psychogenic
bodily reactions would predict their understanding of
this phenomenon. Although direct measures of chil-
dren’s experience could not be obtained, self-report
questions, as well as a parental questionnaire about
children’s experiences, were included at the end of





Eighty children were recruited from a
daycare center and three elementary schools in south-
eastern Michigan. Four children were dropped from



























 1). The remaining participants formed four



































































 10,2–11,4, 4 girls and 8
boys). Children represented a wide variety of socio-
economic backgrounds, and 87% were identified as
White by the interviewer.
In addition, children’s parents were given an op-
tional questionnaire to fill out. Parental response rates
were 39% for preschoolers, 70% for kindergartners,
68% for second graders, and 50% for fifth graders. Fi-
nally, 28 undergraduate college students from an in-
troductory psychology class at a large midwestern
university were included to provide an adult compar-






administered to children individually by the first au-
thor. Before the interviews started, children were in-
formed that they would be told a few stories about
other children and then asked some questions, but
that there were no right or wrong answers. Children
were also given two practice questions to make sure




the interview included four item types: psychogenic,
psychological, physical, and moral. Children were
asked to respond yes or no to (1) psychogenic ques-
tions: whether a psychological event could cause a
physical health outcome (e.g., “Jake felt worried. Do
you think Jake would get a tummyache because he
felt worried?”), (2) psychological questions: whether
a psychological event could cause a behavioral out-
come (e.g., “Paul felt worried. Do you think Paul
would bite his nails because he felt worried?”), (3)
physical questions: whether a physical event could
cause a physical health outcome (e.g., “John ate a rot-
ten apple. Do you think John would get a tummyache
because he ate a rotten apple?”), and (4) moral ques-
tions: whether a moral transgression could cause a
physical health outcome (e.g., “Mark didn’t clean up
after his mess. Do you think Mark would get a tum-
myache because he didn’t clean up after his mess?”).
After each question, children were asked to justify
their answer (“Why?”). There were five sets of ques-
tions; each set included all four item types.
The fact that each set contained all four item types
was an important aspect of the study design, because
it controlled for participants’ willingness to endorse
various outcomes and causes. Within each set, the
psychological event was kept constant and the phys-
ical health outcome was kept constant. In the example
set provided earlier, the physical health outcome was
always getting a stomachache, and the psychological
event was feeling worried (both times). This design
meant that if in fact children had difficulty with the
psychogenic items, that difficulty was not due to
either component alone (feeling worried or getting a
stomachache), but rather to the two in conjunction.
Thus, if children performed well on the psychological
and physical items, as predicted, a lack of under-
standing in the psychogenic case could not be ex-
plained by a misunderstanding of the causes or con-
sequences asked about in the scenario.
Moral items were included so that there would be
one question in each set for which the correct answer
was clearly “no” (see Siegal, 1988, for evidence that
children recognize that moral transgressions cannot
cause disease). This was useful to differentiate a pat-
tern of correct understanding from simply a bias to-
ward answering “yes.” Finally, other biases were de-
termined on the basis of the overall pattern of a
child’s answers. Some children might not endorse
physical, moral, and psychogenic items, for instance,
because they refuse to allow “negative” outcomes.
Questions were administered in a different ran-
dom order for each child, with no two questions from
the same set or of the same type in a row (except the
last item in a few instances). The gender of the story
characters in each question remained consistent
throughout the interview and corresponded to the
gender of the participant.
The final portion of the child interview asked
about the child’s own experience with the bodily re-
actions presented in the first part of the interview
(e.g., “Have you ever gotten a tummyache before?” or
“Have you ever gotten a tummyache because you felt
worried?”). In this series of yes–no questions, if the
child answered “no” to ever having the bodily reac-
tions, the psychogenic experience question was omit-
ted and automatically coded as “no.” These questions
were asked in the same order for all participants. To
help validate children’s answers for the experiential
questions, an optional survey was sent home to all




The items were selected on the basis of
college students’ answers to similar items on a self-
administered questionnaire. Adults were tested in a








93) were asked to rate 52 statements (all four item
types of 13 sets; e.g., “Eating a rotten apple can lead a
person to have a tummyache”) on a 6-point Likert
scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
On the basis of these ratings, five sets were retained





3), and physical, psychological, and psycho-





After some minor revisions, the remaining 20 state-
ments were rated by an additional 28 adults (see


























did not differ significantly from one another (with a
significance level of .008 to control for chance on six


























 .001. Thus, adults typi-
cally endorsed the psychological, physical, and psy-
chogenic links and rejected the moral links.
Results
For each age group, children’s responses were av-
eraged to get the percentage of “correct” versus “in-
correct” answers for each type. “Yes” responses to
psychogenic, psychological, and physical items were
considered correct, and “no” responses to moral
items were considered correct. Adult Likert scale rat-
ings were converted to “yes” and “no” answers so
that adults could be included in the developmental
analyses. A rating of 1, 2, or 3 was assigned a “No”
and a rating of 4, 5, or 6 was assigned a “Yes.” A fre-
quency analysis (with moral items reverse coded)
showed that the modal adult response was a 5 across
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all items. In fact, 59% of all responses were a 5 or a 6.
For 15 out of 20 of the items, the modal response was
a 5 or 6. These results seem to support the decision to
collapse the adult rating scale down to 2 points (cor-
rect or incorrect).
Preliminary analyses revealed no main effects for
gender, nor any interpretable interactions involving
gender. Therefore, this variable was excluded from all




 4 (item type) repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted, with age (preschool,
kindergarten, second grade, fifth grade, adult) as the be-
tween-subjects variable and item type (physical, psy-
chological, moral, and psychogenic) as the within-sub-
jects variable. Table 2 presents the percentage of correct
responses for each age group by item type.
















 .001. Adults had a significantly higher percentage
of correct answers than all other age groups. Pre-
schoolers, kindergartners, second graders, and fifth
graders did not differ from one another in overall per-
















 .001. Psychogenic items yielded









on the psychological, physical, and moral items did
not differ significantly from one another.





















 .001, which indicated a large im-








.001, simple-effects test. Adults performed better than








 .01, Newman-Keuls. Im-









 .005, simple-effects test, with adults
performing better than preschoolers, kindergartners,








 .05, Newman-Keuls, but not
second graders.
 










Item Type Cause Effect Mean Acceptance Rating
Psychogenic Feel nervous Throw up 4.57 (.79)
Psychological Feel nervous Jiggle legs 4.79 (.63)
Physical Eat too much candy Throw up 4.39 (.69)
Moral Pull a cat’s tail Throw up 1.25 (.44)
Psychogenic Feel worried Have a tummyache 4.64 (.91)
Psychological Feel worried Bite nails 4.71 (.90)
Physical Eat a rotten apple Have a tummyache 5.18 (.67)
Moral Make a mess and not clean it up Have a tummyache 2.00 (1.09)
Psychogenic Feel scared Have goosebumps 3.82 (1.31)
Psychological Feel scared Scream 4.82 (.72)
Physical Eat ice cream on cold day Have goosebumps 4.71 (1.05)
Moral Tell a lie Have goosebumps 2.54 (1.14)
Psychogenic Feel frustrated Have a headache 4.79 (1.10)
Psychological Feel frustrated Throw something 4.36 (.87)
Physical Sneezed on by someone with flu germs Have a headache 3.32 (1.22)
Moral Punch someone Have a headache 3.07 (1.18)
Psychogenic Feel shy Face gets red 4.07 (.96)
Psychological Feel shy Become quiet 4.71 (1.58)
Physical Get the chicken pox Face gets red in places 5.61 (.50)




Standard deviations are in parentheses.
 
Table 2 Study 1, Mean Percentage of Correct Responses, by Item Type and Age
 











































































Within each age group, columns with different subscripts are significantly different from one an-







patterns in responding, each participant was classi-
fied into one of six meaningful response patterns or
“other” (see Table 3). Participants’ moral, psycho-
genic, psychological, and physical scores were each









rect). These four ratings formed 16 possible combina-
tions, 6 of which were identified a priori as meaning-
ful. The meaningful patterns included (1) the adult
(correct) pattern, in which respondents were high on
all four types; (2) the low psychogenic pattern, in
which respondents were low on psychogenic, but
high on the other three types; (3) the low emotional
pattern, in which respondents were low on psy-
chogenic and psychological, and high on physical
and moral; (4) the avoidance of negative outcomes
pattern, in which respondents were high on moral
and psychological, but low on psychogenic and phys-
ical; (5) the bias toward responding “yes” pattern, in
which participants were low on moral, but high on
the other three types; and (6) the bias toward re-
sponding “no” pattern, in which respondents were
high on moral, but low on the other three types. Re-
sults showed that the modal majority of the pre-
schoolers, kindergartners, and second graders were
classified in the low psychogenic pattern, whereas the
majority of the fifth graders and adults were classified




To determine the generality of these
effects, each of the five item sets (i.e., the five sets of
questions each including all four item types) was ex-
amined individually. The results mirrored those for
the aggregate data. Most strikingly, psychogenic
items consistently yielded poor performance among
the children. Each of the five item sets was also exam-
ined for each of the four age groups of children, to see
which of the four item types (psychogenic, psycho-
logical, physical, or moral) elicited the lowest level of
performance within the set. By chance alone, psy-
chogenic items was to score lowest on one fourth of
the sets, for a total of five sets. Psychogenic items,
however, elicited the lowest level of performance for
14 of the 20 item sets (5 for preschoolers, 4 for kinder-
gartners, 3 for second graders, and 2 for fifth graders).
For five of the six remaining item sets, the psy-
chogenic item was either tied for the lowest score or
within 5 percentage points of the lowest score. In con-
trast, for adults, psychogenic items scored lowest in




Children’s explanations could pro-
vide additional insight into their reasoning, either in
support of the patterns from the yes/no responses, or
in contrast to those results. If older children were bet-
ter able than younger children to support their correct
answers with psychogenic explanations, this would
lend further support to the developmental compari-
sons. In contrast, if a child answered “no” to the psy-
chogenic question, but gave a reason that indicated
that the psychogenic effect was possible or that an-
other bodily reaction could result from a psychologi-
cal cause, then this would indicate that psychogenic
reasoning was not adequately assessed with the yes/
no response format. Finally, children’s explanations
could shed light on the nature of their reasoning.
For each psychogenic question, children’s explana-
tions were scored as either showing or not showing
understanding of psychogenic bodily reactions. (Adults
could not be included in this analysis because they
were not asked to explain their answers.) On the
question regarding blushing after feeling shy, for ex-
ample, an explanation would be scored as showing
understanding of psychogenic bodily reactions if a
child said, “Sometimes you blush when you are shy
or embarrassed.” A nonpsychogenic explanation to
the same item included, “Because she’s shy,” “That
wouldn’t happen,” or “I don’t know.” Note that chil-
dren’s explanations were scored independently of
their yes/no responses. Thus, it was possible for an
incorrect yes/no answer to be followed by an expla-
nation that demonstrated psychogenic reasoning.
Conversely, a correct yes/no answer could be fol-
lowed by an explanation that did not demonstrate
 
Table 3 Study 1, Percentage of Participants Classified in Each Response Pattern, as a Function of
Age
 
Response Pattern Preschool Kindergarten Grade 2 Grade 5 Adult
Adult (correct) 22 (4) 26 (7) 32 (6) 67 (8) 79 (22)
Low psychogenic 33 (6) 37 (10) 63 (12) 8 (1) 0 (0)
Low emotional 11 (2) 15 (4) 0 (0) 8 (1) 0 (0)
Avoidance of negative outcomes 0 (0) 7 (2) 5 (1) 8 (1) 0 (0)
Bias toward responding “yes” 11 (2) 15 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 18 (5)
Bias toward responding “no” 11 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (1) 0 (0)




s are in parentheses.
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psychogenic reasoning. Answers that referred to
either personal experience or the experience of a fam-
ily member (e.g., “my mother gets this (a headache)
when I annoy her”) were also coded. Two coders
rated children’s responses. One coder rated all of the









the transcripts, randomly selected. Agreement be-
tween the two coders was 94%.
As can be seen in Table 4, psychogenic explana-
tions were most frequent on those trials for which
participants provided a correct yes/no answer. Even
so, psychogenic explanations increased over age;
correspondingly, nonpsychogenic explanations de-
creased. Although the percentage of time that respon-
dents appealed to experience increased slightly with
age, this was quite modest, and nowhere near the rate
of increase of psychogenic explanations overall. This
suggests that developmental changes that are beyond
the effects of increased ability to retrieve memory of a
past psychogenic event may be occurring in chil-
dren’s understanding. A final point is that the forced-
choice task seemed to be fairly accurate in crediting
children with psychogenic understanding, given the
low percentage of children scored as incorrect on the
yes/no task who demonstrated good psychogenic
reasoning in their explanations.
Although this study was not designed to examine





, children’s justifications provided
an opportunity to examine this issue indirectly. That
is, children’s justifications on those trials for which
they denied a psychological event were examined to
determine how often they invoked an alternative
cause that was biological in nature. To the extent that
children did invoke biological alternative causes, this
would suggest that they were construing these events
as biological (not merely bodily). To conduct this
analysis, all alternative-cause justifications given on
trials where children denied a psychogenic effect
were first identified. Each justification was then
coded as belonging to one of five categories: biologi-
cal (illness, digestion, elimination; e.g., “Only hap-
pens when you’re sick”), environmental (e.g., “Only
if it’s cold”), sensation (e.g., “She wasn’t hot”), psy-
chological (“Only happens if you’re excited”), or
other (e.g., “She wasn’t crying”).
There were 158 justifications for “no” answers to









 45, across the four child age groups) as
alternative causes (average agreement among the
three coders was 94%). Average agreement on classi-
fication of these 45 justifications into the five coding
categories was 83%, and all disagreements were re-
solved by discussion. Results of this analysis pro-
vided preliminary support for the claim that children
hold a biological-cause model. Specifically, the modal
alternative-cause justification focused on potential bi-
ological causes (58% biological, 16% environmental,
18% sensation, 2% psychological, and 7% other). This
pattern was found in each of the four age groups.
 
Reports of personal experience.
 
Children’s self-reported
psychogenic experiences were summed and entered
into a one-way ANOVA, with age as the dependent
















 .01, which indicated that fifth graders re-





  2.17 out of 5) than each of the younger
age groups (Ms ranging from 0.83 to 1.29), ps  .05,
Newman-Keuls. A similar developmental trend was
found when those trials on which children reported
not having experienced one or more of these bodily
conditions (tummyache, headache, throwing up,
goosebumps, or face turning red) were dropped. That
is, each child received a percentage score ranging
from 0 to 1, which reflected the number of trials (out
of five) on which they reported a psychogenic bodily
reaction, divided by the number of trials on which
they reported ever having experienced the bodily
condition (with or without a psychological cause). In
this analysis, a main effect was again found for age,
Table 4 Study 1, Percentage of Trials with Explanations Showing Evidence for Psychogenic
Reasoning and Not Showing Evidence for Psychogenic Reasoning, as a Function of Age and
Yes/No Answer
Preschool Kindergarten Grade 2 Grade 5
Yes/no answer correct 
Psychogenic explanation 18 (6) 28 (16) 55 (23) 81 (29)
Nonpsychogenic explanations 82 (28) 72 (41) 45 (19) 19 (7)
Yes/no answer incorrect
Psychogenic explanation 5 (3) 6 (5) 6 (3) 21 (5)
Nonpsychogenic explanation 95 (53) 94 (73) 94 (50) 79 (19)
Appeal to experience 3 (3) 3 (4) 8 (8) 10 (6)
Note: ns are in parentheses.
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F(3, 70)  3.01, p  .05, with fifth graders scoring
higher than second graders, kindergartners, and pre-
schoolers (Ms  .48, .28, .24, and .22, respectively),
ps  .05, Newman-Keuls.
Children’s self-reported personal experiences
with psychogenic bodily reactions were correlated
with their performance on the corresponding psy-
chogenic items, after partialling out the effects of age.
A positive association was found between children’s
self-reported experience with, and their understand-
ing of, psychogenically caused bodily reactions for
each of the five items considered individually, rs of
.34 to .41, all ps  .01. In addition, children were di-
vided into two groups, one of which reported experi-
ence with psychogenic bodily reactions on at least
one of the five trials (n  44) and the other of which
did not (n  32). The mean scores on psychogenic
items for the two groups were compared by using a
simple factorial ANCOVA, with age as the covari-
ate. The results show that the group that had re-
ported experience with psychogenic bodily reac-
tions scored significantly higher on psychogenic
items (.58) than the group that had reported no ex-
perience with psychogenic bodily reactions, .26,
F(1, 75)  17.13, p  .001.
When the same analyses were conducted by using
parental reports of their child’s experience with psy-
chogenic bodily reactions, no relationships were
found. In fact, parent and child reports of experience
were not significantly related. How often parents said
they discussed psychogenic bodily reactions with
their children was also examined, and it was found
that this rate did not change significantly with age:
14% in preschool, 37% in kindergarten, 69% in second
grade, and 50% in fifth grade. A simple factorial
ANCOVA, using age as the covariate, did not distin-
guish psychogenic performance for those children
who were reported to have discussed psychogenic
bodily reactions with their parents versus the remain-
ing children.
Discussion
The primary finding of Study 1 was that children
from preschool age through fifth grade were much
less likely to accept psychogenic bodily reactions than
adults. This result was found when data were col-
lapsed across items, when items were examined indi-
vidually, and when participants were classified into
response patterns. The developmental pattern was
found both with participants’ yes/no responses and
with their justifications. A second, related finding was
that children were less likely to accept psychogenic
bodily reactions than either physically caused bodily
reactions (physical items) or psychologically caused
behavioral reactions (psychological items). This was
so even though the psychological causes were identi-
cal for the psychological and the psychogenic items,
and the physical outcomes were identical for the
physical and the psychogenic items.
It was hypothesized that children might be partic-
ularly resistant to the psychogenic items because they
tap into cross-domain understanding. That is, chil-
dren’s difficulty might lie precisely in accepting that a
psychological cause could have a bodily effect. Such
an explanation would account for children’s high per-
formance on the within-domain items (physical and
psychological). Alternative explanations of these data,
however, are possible.
One possibility is that age differences on this task
were due to increased information-processing abili-
ties. Older children might have a better grasp of the
elements of the task (e.g., phrases such as “felt frus-
trated” or “flu germs”) or might be better at mentally
retaining both cause and effect on a given item. Per-
haps the younger children were biased toward re-
sponding “no” to every item. The design of the study
and the obtained patterns of results, however, argue
against these explanations. Even the youngest chil-
dren had no difficulty reasoning about the components
of the task (e.g., feeling frustrated as a cause; getting a
headache as an effect) when they were presented on
the physical and psychological items. Moreover, the
pattern displayed by the younger children (poor per-
formance on psychogenic, high on the remainder)
could be found only if they were able to mentally re-
tain both cause and effect. If children had focused on
causes only, they would have rejected both psy-
chogenic and psychological items; if they had focused
on effects only, they would have rejected psycho-
genic, physical, and moral items. Instead, children
selectively rejected psychogenic items. Children also
had no difficulty appropriately supplying both “yes”
and “no” responses, as indicated by their responses to
physical, psychological, and moral questions (which
required “yes,” “yes,” and “no” answers, respectively,
to be coded as correct).
A second alternative account of the results is
that children’s responses might reflect their belief that
psychogenic reactions are relatively rare. When chil-
dren were asked to judge whether an event occurred,
perhaps they were judging the probability of its occur-
rence rather than the possibility of its occurrence. A
child might reason that worrying could lead to a stom-
achache, but for any given individual this effect
would be rare, so the child predicted that it did not
happen for the character in the story. According to
this view, children did not deny that psychogenic
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bodily effects could take place, but rather judged
them to be infrequent. This interpretation cannot,
however, fully explain the results, because a number
of the other items were likewise relatively rare (e.g.,
biting nails when worried, throwing something when
frustrated, jiggling legs when nervous), but were
readily accepted by even the youngest children. It is
also difficult to see how this would account for the de-
velopmental differences that were found. Nonethe-
less, Study 2 was designed in part to provide further
evidence regarding this alternative interpretation. In
Study 2, all events were novel and thus low probability.
A third possibility is that children’s difficulty with
psychogenic items arose from their own lack of per-
sonal experience with these events, rather than a re-
sistance to cross-domain phenomena. In support of
this interpretation, children’s self-reported personal
experiences with psychogenic bodily reactions did
correlate significantly with their rate of accepting
psychogenic phenomena. Respondents who reported
any type of experience with psychogenic bodily reac-
tions scored higher on the psychogenic items than
those with no experience. Unfortunately, however,
causal direction could not be determined: Under-
standing of psychogenic phenomena could have de-
veloped as a result of personal experience, or under-
standing of one’s own psychogenic experiences could
have developed as a result of coming to appreciate
psychogenic phenomena more generally. To illustrate
the latter: Young children who get stomachaches
when worried may not link the emotional state with
the bodily state, and may simply believe that they
are sick. It is also possible that the correlation be-
tween the two measures was inflated because the self-
report questions directly followed the primary study
questions.
Complicating this issue further is the finding that
parental reports about children’s psychogenic experi-
ences did not correlate significantly with children’s
reports of their own psychogenic experiences, nor
were parental reports associated with children’s per-
formance on psychogenic items. This lack of corre-
spondence does not indicate who is more accurate:
children or parents. On the one hand, it could simply
show that the parents had little direct access to their
children’s emotional states (i.e., that the children were
more accurate). On the other hand, it could indicate
that the young children were not very sensitive to
their own psychogenic experiences (i.e., that the par-
ents were more accurate). It is important, however, to
keep in mind that the number of parents who filled
out and returned the questionnaire was quite small
(7 parents of preschoolers, 18 of kindergartners, 8 of
second graders, and 6 of fifth graders), so confidence
in these results is limited. One indirect piece of evi-
dence that children’s responses do not simply reflect
lack of experience is that the youngest children were
likely to have less experience with all of these items
(e.g., getting a headache because of the flu), but they
were lower only on the psychogenic items.
In summary, Study 1 demonstrates that an under-
standing of psychogenic bodily reactions increased
rather dramatically with age. The design of the study
argues against the possibility that age differences
were due to general task demands, because the age ef-
fects were specific to psychogenic reasoning. It is sug-
gested that these results might reflect children’s ten-
dency to distinguish the domains of psychology and
bodily experience. Study 1 left unclear, however,
the role of experience in mediating psychogenic un-
derstanding. It is also possible that children were re-
porting their beliefs about event frequency rather
than event probability. Study 2 addressed these issues
more directly.
STUDY 2
Study 2 tested children’s understanding of psy-
chogenic bodily reactions when prior experience was
minimized. To reduce the effects of participants’ prior
experience, study questions that concerned hypothet-
ical creatures from another planet were posed. For in-
stance, on one item children heard, “Plunim has two
antennae. One day, Plunim’s antennae drooped. Do
you think Plunim’s antennae drooped because she
felt angry [psychological cause] or because she got
pricked with a dirty needle [physical cause]?” Be-
cause children did not have any familiarity with what
happens on Plunim’s planet, they were forced to in-
voke their naive biases regarding psychological and
physical (bodily) causal processes. Even more impor-
tant, with no reference to situations they might have
experienced before, participants’ responses revealed
whether they believed that mental states could influ-
ence bodily reactions. The rationale for using a forced-
choice response format in Study 2 (versus a yes/no
response format in Study 1) was to avoid a “floor ef-
fect,” with respondents rejecting all scenarios simply
because they did not occur in real life. The forced-
choice format also allowed assessment of the relative
strength of psychological versus physical causes of
bodily events.
Study 2 had several advantages that built on Study
1. First, Study 2 helped to determine whether the de-
velopmental differences shown in Study 1 were the
direct result of knowledge/experience with particu-
lar psychogenic events. If past experience was the
prime determinant, then no age differences in perfor-
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mance would be observed in Study 2, for which chil-
dren could not rely on past experience. Second, Study
2 allowed for the examination of the generality of
children’s understanding, when they began to en-
dorse psychogenic bodily reactions. If children had a
general appreciation for the phenomenon, then they
would invoke it even with novel examples.
Third, Study 2 helped to circumvent some of the
problems with the yes/no format of Study 1, in which
young participants may have rejected certain items
because they were rare. Because all of the events in
Study 2 were unlikely (i.e., anything resulting in droop-
ing antennae was outside the child’s experience), chil-
dren would not select their answers on the basis of
which events were familiar. Furthermore, the psycho-
logical causes (various common emotional states)
were considerably more frequent in children’s past
experience than the physical causes (various unpleas-
ant mishaps) so that if the younger children were re-
lying on probability of occurrence, in Study 2 they
would have a preference for endorsing the psy-
chogenic scenarios (psychological causes of the bodily
reactions). If, however, they had a principled avoid-
ance of psychogenic events, they would have a pref-
erence for endorsing the physical scenarios (physical
causes of the bodily reactions).
Methods
Participants. Fifty-four children were recruited
from three daycare centers and two public elemen-
tary schools in southeastern Michigan. None of these
children had participated in Study 1. Participants
formed three groups: 18 preschoolers (mean age 
4,6, range  4,3–5,0, 9 girls and 9 boys), 18 kindergart-
ners (mean age  5,7, range  5,5–6,4, 8 girls and 10
boys), and 18 second graders (mean age  7,8, range 
7,3–8,0, 8 girls and 10 boys). Children represented a
wide variety of socioeconomic backgrounds, and 96%
were identified as White by the interviewer.
In addition, 48 undergraduates from an introduc-
tory psychology class at a large midwestern univer-
sity were recruited to pretest the items. Their data
served as the adult comparison group in the analyses.
Materials and procedure. All interviews occurred in
a private research room and lasted approximately 15
min. Children heard the following introductory
statement: “Zantar is an alien planet. All the crea-
tures on planet Zantar are just like people, but their
bodies look very different. Listen to the stories and
look at the pictures about the beings on planet Zantar
and after each story, tell me which answer you think
is best.” After two easy practice questions (e.g.,
would someone who received birthday presents
open them up or throw them away?), intended to
check that participants were comfortable and atten-
tive to the task, eight questions were presented to
each child.
Each question first presented a character (matched
in gender to the participant) and a particular at-
tribute of that character (e.g., “Tarlin has a tail”).
Next, participants were told that some change had
occurred in that attribute (e.g., “One day, Tarlin’s tail
hurt”). Finally, participants were asked to choose
between two possibilities (psychological or physical)
to explain why this change in the attribute had
occurred (e.g., “Do you think Tarlin’s tail hurt be-
cause s/he felt worried [psychological choice] or
because s/he ate something that was rotten [physical
choice]?”). 
A list of items appears in Table 5. A book of simple
illustrations accompanied the questions. The differ-
ent creatures looked alike except that the relevant
attribute for each character was highlighted (cross-
hatched, bolded, colored) in that character’s illustra-
tion. In addition, a before-and-after picture was pre-
sented to further highlight the particular change in
each attribute.
After answering the question, participants were
given the opportunity to explain their choice (“Why?”).
Table 5 Study 2 Items
Bodily Change Psychological Cause Physical Cause
Tail hurt Felt worried Ate something that was rotten
Claws hurt Felt frustrated Was touched by someone with germs
Antennae drooped Felt angry Got pricked with a dirty needle
Eyebrows got white stripes Felt mad Was bitten by a bug
Toes got puffy Felt embarrassed Drank dirty water
Red eyes turned yellow Felt frightened Was scratched by an animal
Tongue ached Felt disappointed Sat in the sun too long
Teeth stung Felt jealous Got someone else’s blood mixed in 
his/her blood
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Items were randomly ordered for each participant.
The order of answer choice (psychological or physi-
cal) within each item alternated over the set of ques-
tions for each participant.
Pretesting. Items were designed to be analogous
to real-life psychogenic and physical bodily reac-
tions but to differ in the specifics to discourage draw-
ing on human experience to answer the questions.
Thus, for example, participants were not asked
whether eating something cold would make an
alien’s fur stand up on its back, because this would
be too similar to actual human experience. The goal
was to come up with a set of items for which both
psychological and physical answers would be ap-
propriate (as judged by adults), so as to enable obser-
vation of children’s naive biases regarding illness
causality. Thus, items were selected so that half the
time adult participants would choose psychological
reasons and half the time they would choose physi-
cal reasons.
Forty-eight undergraduates were administered a
questionnaire version of the Study 2 interview, with a
larger set of items. Physical answers were coded as 0
and psychological answers were coded as 1, and the
average response was calculated for each participant.
The mean across participants was .44, which indi-
cated that participants were equally likely to choose
physical and psychological responses. Of this larger
set of items, eight items were selected that individu-
ally showed no bias toward either physical or psycho-
logical responses (i.e., the average response across
participants for each question fell between .35 and
.64). The average total score on these eight items on
the pretesting questionnaire was .49.
Results
As with the pretest, each physical answer was
coded as 0 and each psychological answer was coded
as 1. Although preliminary analyses included gender
as a between-subjects variable, this variable was ex-
cluded from final analyses because there were no in-
terpretable effects involving gender. Answers were
averaged across the eight items and entered into a
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, with age (pre-
school, kindergarten, second grade, adult) as the be-
tween-subjects variable.
A main effect was found for age, F(3, 98)  9.35,
p  .001, which indicates that preschoolers (M  .21)
and kindergartners (M  .24) chose fewer psycholog-
ical responses than second graders (M  .54) or adults
(M  .49), ps  .01, by Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests.
No differences in responses were found between pre-
schoolers and kindergartners or between second
graders and adults. Preschoolers and kindergartners
selected psychological responses below chance, ps 
.001 by t test, whereas second graders’ and adults’
choices did not differ from chance.
An examination of individual items mirrors the re-
sults of the ANOVA, namely, a pattern of avoiding
psychological responses among preschoolers and
kindergartners and a mixed response pattern among
second graders. Specifically, both preschoolers and
kindergartners selected the psychological choice less
than 30% of the time on seven of the eight items, but
second graders did not show this pattern for any of
the eight items. Whereas seven of the eight items
scored close to the midpoint for second graders (i.e.,
between 35%–65%), only one item at each of the pre-
school and kindergarten ages scored in that middle
range.
In addition, the response patterns of individuals
were examined. Participants at each age were indi-
vidually classified into three groups: One group that
chose primarily physical causes (six to eight trials out
of eight), another group that chose primarily psycho-
logical causes (six to eight out of eight), and a third
group that chose a mixture of both physical and psy-
chological causes (all remaining participants). The re-
sults of this analysis were consistent with the ANOVA
analyses: Primarily physical causes decreased with
age (72% of preschoolers and 67% of kindergartners
versus 28% of second graders and 25% of adults), and
primarily psychological causes increased with age
(0% of preschoolers and 5% of kindergartners versus
39% of second graders and 23% of adults).
Discussion
Study 2 showed a clear developmental shift be-
tween kindergarten and second grade in children’s
willingness to attribute psychological causes to novel
bodily events. When asked what could have caused
various bodily reactions in alien creatures, adults and
second graders selected both psychological and phys-
ical causes, whereas preschoolers and kindergartners
strongly preferred physical causes. These results were
consistent with those of Study 1. As in Study 1, the
youngest children seemed to avoid psychogenic re-
sponses, and this tendency diminished with age.
The present results also extend beyond those of the
first study. Because the questions in Study 2 con-
cerned unfamiliar alien creatures, participants could
not rely on their knowledge of particular past events
that they or others had experienced. In other words,
the pattern of results cannot be attributed to a simple
response strategy in which participants endorsed
those events that they had heard of before, and re-
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jected those events that they had not heard of before.
Instead, participants were differentiating the events
at a more abstract level. Furthermore, because the
psychological causes (i.e., simple emotions) were
more commonly experienced than the physical causes
(i.e., unusual mishaps), avoiding a psychogenic re-
sponse entailed selecting the less common event. Be-
cause the youngest children preferred the physical
causes, they were not simply selecting causes on the
basis of their familiarity or probability of occurrence.
This further supports the interpretation that younger
children do not simply report those events with
which they are familiar, but rather seem to reject
cross-domain scenarios.
At the same time, the data cannot be used to argue
that past experience played no role in children’s un-
derstanding of these events. It may be that the chil-
dren had come to deny the possibility of psychogenic
events because they rarely experienced them, even
though these specific bodily events were unfamiliar to
all participants. That is, the children may in effect
have been saying “I’ve never seen that kind of event
[psychogenic], but I have seen that kind of event
[physical].” This could be thought of as a more subtle
form of experience-based responding. If, however,
this was in fact what children were doing, it demon-
strates that children had gone from experiencing a se-
lected set of specific events to forming abstract gener-
alizations about which sorts of events were possible
or not. This possibility is considered in the General
Discussion.
One difference in the results of the two studies is
that second graders endorsed psychogenic causes in
Study 2, but not in Study 1. This discrepancy could
reflect the different task demands across the two
studies. In both studies, second graders accepted
psychogenic events on roughly half the trials. In
Study 1, this rate of response was considered low
because it fell far below response rates on corre-
sponding psychological or physical items. In Study
2, however, this rate of response was considered rel-
atively high because it far exceeded the rates of pre-
schoolers and kindergartners. In any case, it is clear
that the youngest children (preschoolers and kinder-
gartners) consistently denied psychogenic bodily
reactions, that second and fifth graders were in a pe-
riod of transition, and that adults readily accepted
psychogenic events.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of these two studies support a develop-
mental path from viewing psychogenic bodily re-
sponses as wholly physical phenomena to viewing
them as both physical and psychological phenomena.
Young children typically denied that psychogenic
bodily reactions could occur and predicted that un-
familiar bodily conditions resulted from physical
causes only. Adults, however, typically reported that
psychogenic bodily reactions were possible and that
unfamiliar bodily conditions could result from either
psychological or physical causes. Children’s responses
in both studies were consistent with the interpreta-
tion that they believed that bodily ailments could not
result from a mental cause. These results extend be-
yond recent findings showing that children distin-
guished mental from physical phenomena when
appropriate (see Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Schult &
Wellman, 1997; Wellman & Estes, 1986). Even when
considering phenomena in which the domains did in
fact interact, young children continued to deny cross-
domain interactions.
One issue that this research leaves open concerns
the nature of children’s biological understandings. Al-
though the present data suggest that children distin-
guished mind from body, whether they construed
these bodily conditions as biological is unclear. Carey
(1995) and Au and Romo (1999) argued that young
children’s grasp of bodily events are not at first bio-
logical, whereas Keil (1992, 1994) and Springer (1992,
1996) argued that they are biological. This debate will
not be recapitulated here, but Kalish’s (1997) point
that what “counts” as biological understanding will
depend in part on one’s criterion (e.g., possessing
domain-specific facts versus specific understanding
of the mechanisms involved in the causal processes is
emphasized).
Another question concerns the generality of the
current results. Psychogenic bodily reactions are just
one example of cross-domain phenomena, and it is
not known if other cross-domain phenomena simi-
larly pose conceptual difficulties for children. Future
research could test children’s understanding of other
mind–body concepts such as biofeedback, medita-
tion/hypnosis, or enhanced bodily performance. One
could also extend this research design to examine
phenomena in which a physical cause (e.g., a drug) re-
sults in a psychological effect (e.g., changed mental
state). In all of these cases, the theoretical account pre-
sented here would predict that young children would
have difficulty understanding these events as cross-
domain phenomena. Until more data are available,
however, the present studies must be understood as a
demonstration that children do not recognize one
case of mind–body interaction (i.e., psychogenic
bodily reactions), rather than as evidence supporting
the hypothesis that young children are reluctant to
cross domain boundaries.
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Intentional behaviors may also be argued to in-
volve domain crossing but certainly are readily ac-
cepted by even young children. For example, inten-
tionally carrying out an action, such as deciding to
walk across a room, could be argued to entail a psy-
chological cause (one’s intention) and a physical ef-
fect (the physical behavior of moving one’s body
through space). If accepting these cases entails tran-
scending domain boundaries, then this would under-
cut the theoretical explanation thus far provided. The
apparent conflict, however, between the theoretical
account presented here and this class of phenomenon
is a true conflict only if children in fact view volitional
behaviors as instances of mind–body interaction.
This is an empirical question that has not yet been
tested. Children might accept the contingency be-
tween mental states and intentional actions (on the
basis of extensive personal experience) without con-
sidering the causal implications of such phenomena
(e.g., analogous to how children understand remote-
control devices).
Alternatively, it is possible that children do under-
stand that with volitional behaviors, mental states
can cause bodily outcomes. If so, then a more specific
explanation would be required to explain the diffi-
culty that children had with the phenomena exam-
ined in the present studies. Children’s difficulty, for
example, may specifically involve understanding that
mental states can cause involuntary bodily responses.
Thus, children’s difficulty may have been with mind–
biology interactions, rather than with mindbody
interactions.
One crucial issue in this work concerns the source
of the developmental differences that were obtained,
including the role of experience. Although Study 2
rules out the possibility that developmental differ-
ences were simply due to differing levels of familiar-
ity with specific psychogenic phenomena, experience
is certainly one plausible source of developmental
change in this area. The key issue is whether children
denied cross-domain interactions (1) in spite of en-
countering evidence to the contrary, or instead (2) be-
cause they had failed to encounter sufficient evidence
for them. From a practical or applied perspective, the
answer to this question is important in determining
how to help younger children appreciate their own
psychogenic bodily reactions and potentially aid in
their own care. From a theoretical perspective, the an-
swer is important in understanding the role of do-
mains in early cognition.
The present data do not provide direct evidence on
this issue. Nor would it be straightforward to exam-
ine children’s own experiences of psychogenic reac-
tions, because parents do not have direct access to
children’s emotional states, and children’s self-
reports may be limited by their own conceptual biases
(e.g., a child may experience a stress-induced head-
ache, yet not realize the true cause because he or she
believes that mental states cannot affect the body). It
would be valuable, however, to conduct an interven-
tion study to determine how readily children can be
taught to appreciate cross-domain (specifically, psy-
chogenic) phenomena. If indeed children have a con-
ceptual bias to resist cross-domain interactions, then
direct training should have little effect on children of
kindergarten age or younger. If children are limited
instead by lack of knowledge and experience, then a
training intervention should boost their performance.
At present this remains an open empirical question.
Regardless of how children come to better under-
stand this class of psychogenic phenomena, impor-
tant changes are clearly taking place between pre-
school and middle childhood in how children structure
the boundaries of these domains. Children appear to
go from at first considering these domains to be sepa-
rate and strictly modular to recognizing that the do-
mains interact with and influence one another. This
observation calls into question views in which do-
main boundaries are considered innately fixed and
unchanging (see Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, for discus-
sion of domains and experience). Studies that focus
solely on cases in which domain boundaries are ap-
propriate have yielded a picture in which the do-
mains are well established by the preschool years and
undergo little structural change. Cross-domain studies
such as the present one, however, provide significant
test cases of structural invariance in domain reason-
ing and offer a new perspective on this issue.
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